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Notes
The Cost of Survival for
Insulin-Dependent Diabetics
NIKOL NESTERENKO†
Insulin, an injectable drug discovered about 100 years ago that now costs less than $5 to
manufacture, is currently sold between $300 and $500 in the United States. The continuously
growing price forces many insulin-dependent diabetics to forego their lifesaving medication,
which can result in death. Although insulin manufacturers are a significant cause of insulin
unaffordability in this country, pharmacy benefit managers (PBMs), such as CVS Caremark,
OptumRx, and Express Scripts, are essential in the insulin market and pressure insulin
manufacturers to provide higher rebates, leading to higher prices for consumers.
Some states have addressed this issue by passing legislation capping the price that insured, and
in some instances uninsured, individuals pay for insulin. However, these laws generally do not
provide assistance for the underinsured, or those with self-funded plans governed by federal law.
State laws capping the price of insulin are a viable short-term solution, but they do not tackle the
root cause of price manipulation in the pharmaceutical industry. There must be a comprehensive
plan to address PBMs and their influence on the pharmaceutical market. Federal legislation
capping the price of insulin for all insulin-dependent diabetics will increase transparency, create
universal price limits on insulin, and prevent unnecessary deaths.

† J.D. Candidate, 2023, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; Executive Technology
Editor, Hastings Law Journal. I would like to thank Professors Robert Schwartz and Sarah Hooper for their
incredible guidance and encouragement. I would also like to thank the HLJ team for their hard work and
invaluable feedback.

181

182

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 74:181

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................183
I.
DIABETES AND THE HISTORY OF INSULIN ............................................187
A. TYPES OF INSULIN AND WAYS TO ADMINISTER THE
MEDICATION ................................................................................188
B. HISTORY OF INSULIN ....................................................................190
II.
HIDDEN PRICING SCHEMES THAT AFFECT INSULIN PRICES ................191
A. HOW PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS AND INSULIN
MANUFACTURERS OPERATE ........................................................191
B. INSULIN PRICING LITIGATION ......................................................194
1. Chaires v. Novo Nordisk ........................................................194
2. Harris County v. Eli Lilly & Co. ............................................196
III.
PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND CURRENT LEGISLATION ..........................197
A. NATIONALIZE THE PATENT FOR INSULIN TO INCREASE
PRODUCTION ................................................................................198
B. COLORADO’S INSULIN PRICE CAP LEGISLATION .........................200
IV.
ADDITIONAL STATE ACTION AND FEDERAL LEGISLATION FOR AN
EFFICIENT SOLUTION ...........................................................................202
A. COLORADO’S INSULIN CAP LEGISLATION AS A MODEL FOR
OTHER STATES .............................................................................202
B. FEDERAL INSULIN PRICE CAP .......................................................204
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................206

December 2022]

THE COST OF SURVIVAL

183

INTRODUCTION
1

“How many more?” Many insulin-dependent diabetics and their families
ask this question every time the media announces that yet another individual
with type 1 diabetes has died because they could not afford the price of insulin.
Individuals like Meaghan Carter and Alec Smith die from rationing insulin due
to a lack of insurance coverage, high deductibles, and expensive copays.2 Every
year, type 1 diabetics suffer from diabetic ketoacidosis (DKA) due to insufficient
levels of insulin, which can lead to death.3 In 2018, the CDC estimated that 34.2
million people had diabetes in the United States.4 Of those, over 1.5 million
individuals were diagnosed with type 1 diabetes.5 Unlike type 2 diabetes, which
can initially be treated with oral medication, type 1 diabetes can only
be treated with insulin injections.6 Without proper access to insulin, diabetics
have increased risks for complications, such as DKA and peripheral
neuropathy.7 However, the growing price of this lifesaving medication decreases
an insulin-dependent diabetic’s opportunity to maintain their personal health.
An estimated 100 million individuals around the world require insulin
injections to survive.8 A study in 2018 showed that both the manufacturing and
list price of insulin is much higher in the United States than in other high-income
countries.9 The manufacturing price, also known as net price, is the amount a
manufacturer expects to receive from health plans, pharmacies, and pharmacy
benefit managers (PBMs), while the list price reflects the amount that the patient
pays.10 For example, in 2018, the manufacturing price of one vial of fast-acting
insulin in the United States was $99.94, while the prices for the same
insulin in Canada and the United Kingdom were $12.99 and $8.09,

1. “How Many More?” Family Mourns the Loss of Meaghan Carter, RIGHT CARE ALL., https://rightcare
alliance.org/article/how-many-more-family-mourns-the-loss-meaghan-carter/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2022)
[hereinafter “How Many More?”].
2. Id.; Tiffany Stanley, Life, Death and Insulin, WASH. POST (Jan. 7, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost
.com/news/magazine/wp/2019/01/07/feature/insulin-is-a-lifesaving-drug-but-it-has-become-intolerablyexpensive-and-the-consequences-can-be-tragic/.
3. See Stanley, supra note 2.
4. CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL DIABETES STATISTICS REPORT 2020, at 2
(2020), https://www.cdc.gov/diabetes/pdfs/data/statistics/national-diabetes-statistics-report.pdf.
5. Id. at 5.
6. Medication & Treatments, AM. DIABETES ASS’N, https://www.diabetes.org/healthy-living/medicationtreatments (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
7. Diabetes Complications, AM. DIABETES ASS’N, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes/complications
[https://web.archive.org/web/20211010080854/https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes/complications].
8. See Dzintars Gotham, Melissa J. Barber & Andrew Hill, Production Costs and Potential Prices for
Biosimilars of Human Insulin and Insulin Analogues, BMJ GLOB. HEALTH, Sept. 25, 2018, at 1, 1
https://gh.bmj.com/content/bmjgh/3/5/e000850.full.pdf.
9. ANDREW W. MULCAHY, DANIEL SCHWAM & NATE EDENFIELD, COMPARING INSULIN PRICES IN THE
U.S. TO OTHER COUNTRIES 10 (2020), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/migrated_legacy_files//196281
/Comparing-Insulin-Prices.pdf.
10. See Inmaculada Hernandez, Alvaro San-Juan-Rodriguez, Chester B. Good & Walid F. Gellad, Changes
in List Prices, Net Prices, and Discounts for Branded Drugs in the US, 2007-2018, 323 JAMA 854, 854 (2020),
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC7054846/.
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respectively.11 Meanwhile, the list price of one vial of fast-acting insulin in the
United States was between $300 and $500.12 Another study in 2018 revealed
that the cost of producing one vial of insulin in the United States was between
$2.32 and $3.76. 13 These studies show that the cost of producing insulin is
significantly less than the price insulin-dependent diabetics pay.
The price of insulin is not only determined by production costs and
demand, but is also significantly affected by the rebate, which is the percentage
that the manufacturer pays the PBM.14 Although pharmaceutical companies are
responsible for setting the manufacturing price for insulin in the United States,
PBMs have an influential role in determining the list price and contribute to the
continuously growing price of insulin.15 While patients are shown the list price
when paying for medication, insurers often pay a negotiated rate for the
prescription based on their agreements with PBMs.16 The list price is affected
by rebates and negotiated discounts between insulin manufacturers and PBMs.17
PBMs are responsible for placing drugs into specific tiers within a formulary
for over 266 million patients nationwide.18 The largest PBMs include Express
Scripts, CVS Caremark, and OptumRx, which establish formularies that affect
over 70% of all prescription claims in the United States.19
A formulary is the list of covered prescription drugs and specific brands
within a health plan. 20 PBMs receive payments in the form of rebates from
manufacturers for their products to be included in the formulary. 21 Because
PBMs require higher rebates to ensure manufacturer exclusivity within a health
plan’s coverage, manufacturers increase the price of insulin for patients to retain
their profits. Between 2009 and 2015, the list price of Eli Lilly’s insulin
increased by 138%.22 An investigation conducted by the U.S. Senate’s Financial

11. Id.
12. See Benita Lee, How Much Does Insulin Cost? Here’s How 28 Brands and Generics Compare,
GOODRX HEALTH (Jan. 26, 2022), https://www.goodrx.com/healthcare-access/research/how-much-doesinsulin-cost-compare-brands; STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 117TH CONG., REPORT ON INSULIN: EXAMINING THE
FACTORS DRIVING THE RISING COST OF A CENTURY OLD DRUG 44 (Comm. Print 2021).
13. See Gotham et al., supra note 8, at 2.
14. See generally DAVID H. KRELING, COST CONTROL FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUG PROGRAMS: PHARMACY
BENEFIT MANAGER (PBM) EFFORTS, EFFECTS, AND IMPLICATIONS (2020), https://aspe.hhs.gov/cost-controlprescription-drug-programs-pharmacy-benefit-manager-pbm-efforts-effects-implications.
15. William T. Cefalu, Daniel E. Dawes, Gina Gavlak, Dana Goldman, William H. Herman, Karen Van
Nuys, Alvin C. Powers, Simeon I. Taylor & Alan L. Yatvin, Insulin Access and Affordability Working Group:
Conclusions and Recommendations, 41 DIABETES CARE 1299, 1301 (2018).
16. See KRELING, supra note 14.
17. Id.
18. Cefalu et al., supra note 15, at 1303.
19. Id.
20. Pharmacy Benefit Managers and Their Role in Drug Spending, THE COMMONWEALTH FUND (Apr. 22,
2019), https://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/explainer/2019/apr/pharmacy-benefit-managers-andtheir-role-drug-spending [hereinafter Pharmacy Benefit Managers].
21. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 6–7, Boss v. CVS Health Corp., No. 17-01823
(D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2017).
22. Cefalu et al., supra note 15, at 1302.
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Committee found that Novo Nordisk and Sanofi, two of the largest insulin
manufacturers, mirrored each other’s price increases, and at times would match
the price increase “within days or even hours.”23
A hypothetical example helps demonstrate why manufacturers increase the
list price. If the list price of insulin is $200 and the requested rebate is 40%, then
the PBM will make $80, while the manufacturer will make $120. If the PBM
demands a higher rebate of 60%, but the list price remains the same, the
manufacturer will only make $80, while the PBM will get $120. If the
manufacturer decides to increase the list price to $250 with a 60% rebate for the
PBM, the manufacturer will get $150, while the PBM will receive $100. By
increasing the list price, the manufacturer ensures that it will not reduce its
profits while paying a higher percentage to PBMs to ensure a favorable
placement in the formulary. Without transparency regarding pricing
mechanisms, PBMs are able to influence the list price set by manufacturers,
which detrimentally affects patients without insurance or high deductible plans.
Due to the unaffordability of insulin in the United States, many patients
choose to travel to Canada or Mexico to purchase insulin. The United States
International Trade Commission estimated that in 2013, almost one million
California residents traveled to Mexico for medical care, which includes the
purchase of prescription drugs.24 Some purchased plane tickets to border states
and drove to pharmacies in Mexico because the transportation costs were still
lower than the cost of insulin in their home states.25 Utah created a “Pharmacy
Tourism Program,” which reimburses patients for travel costs to preapproved
pharmacies in Mexico to obtain lifesaving medications that are too costly in
the United States. 26 These drastic measures to obtain lifesaving medications
emphasize the need to address the prohibitive prices of prescription medication
in the United States.
Insulin rationing leads to insufficient insulin levels in the body that can
cause DKA, where an affected individual may fall into a coma and die.27 In
2017, 220,340 individuals were diagnosed with DKA, and 835 of these cases
resulted in death.28 On average, the direct hospital expenses and long-term costs
of DKA are around $2.4 billion annually.29
23. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 12, at 6.
24. See ARTHUR CHAMBERS, TRENDS IN U.S. HEALTH TRAVEL SERVICES TRADE 2 (2015),
https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/executive_briefings/chambers_health-related_travel_final.pdf.
25. Cathy Free, This Couple Goes to Mexico To Buy Low-Cost Insulin for Strangers Who Need It, WASH.
POST (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/2020/03/06/this-couple-goes-mexico-buy-lowcost-insulin-strangers-who-need-it/.
26. Pharmacy Tourism Program, PEHP HEALTH & BENEFITS, https://www.pehp.org/pharmacy/tourism
(last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
27. Diabetes & DKA (Ketoacidosis), AM. DIABETES ASS’N, https://www.diabetes.org/diabetes
/complications/dka-ketoacidosis-ketones (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
28. Kamleshun Ramphul & Jyotsnav Joynauth, An Update on the Incidence and Burden of Diabetic
Ketoacidosis in the U.S., 43 DIABETES CARE e196, e197 (2020).
29. Abbas E. Kitabchi, Guillermo E. Umpierrez, John M. Miles & Joseph N. Fisher, Hyperglycemic Crises
in Adult Patients with Diabetes, 32 DIABETES CARE 1335, 1335 (2009).
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In 2017, Alec Raeshawn Smith turned twenty-six, which meant that he was
no longer covered by his mother’s health insurance plan and was required to
obtain his own insurance policy.30 However, his employer did not offer health
insurance benefits, and his $35,000 income was above the threshold for
Medicaid in Minnesota.31 A private insurance option would cost $450 per month
with a $7,000 deductible, requiring Alec to pay $7,000 out-of-pocket for his
medical expenses before his policy began covering his costs.32 Due to these high
costs, Alec chose to forego insurance.33 While he was on his mother’s health
insurance plan, his out-of-pocket monthly expenses for diabetic supplies were
between $200 and $300.34 However, his monthly insulin cost without insurance
was now around $1,000. 35 The drastic increase in the price for his medical
supplies led to his decision to ration his insulin, and within a month of losing his
mother’s insurance coverage, Alec died.36
Meaghan Carter was diagnosed with type 1 diabetes in 2000 and had
sufficient control over her condition until she lost her job and insurance coverage
in June 2018.37 Meaghan was able to receive assistance from family and friends
through September 2018 to help afford her $800 monthly insulin prescription.38
In December 2018, Meaghan found a job that was set to start in early 2019 and
was scheduled to receive a direct deposit on December 26th, which would cover
the cost of her insulin until her new insurance became effective.39 However, by
December, Meaghan was running out of her usual insulin supply and turned to
intermediate-acting insulin (human insulin), which costs $25 per vial, but is
highly unpredictable and an inadequate replacement for good blood-glucose
control. 40 On December 24th, Meaghan was feeling sick and throwing up. 41
On Christmas morning, Meaghan’s roommate found her dead from DKA.42 As
insulin prices continue to rise, more individuals like Alec and Meaghan will
attempt to ration their insulin, increasing their risk for complications and the
possibility of death.
Type 1 diabetics require constant insulin injections to survive, because
the disease cannot be prevented or cured, only managed. 43 Insulin was first
developed in 1922, and the first manufacturers in the market currently hold the
30. See Stanley, supra note 2.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Mindi Patterson, Losing Meaghan to the Perfect Storm, T1 INT’L (Feb. 8, 2019, 2:48 PM),
https://www.t1international.com/blog/2019/02/08/losing-meaghan-perfect-storm/.
38. See “How Many More?”, supra note 1.
39. Patterson, supra note 37.
40. Id.; Lee, supra note 12.
41. Patterson, supra note 37.
42. Id.
43. Stanley, supra note 2.
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patents for modern insulin through slight modifications, limiting the number of
competitors due to its classification as a biologic.44 Even after almost a century
since insulin was first introduced to type 1 diabetic patients, its price continues
to incrementally increase due to market manipulation by insulin manufacturers
and PBMs.
This Note explains how PBMs play a significant role in the increasing price
of insulin and argues that state regulations are the most viable short-term
solution, while federal legislation is required for a long-term solution. Part I
analyzes the history of insulin and its price growth over multiple decades. Part
II discusses the increasing role of PBMs’ pricing schemes and the allegations of
price manipulation that have been brought to light in several ongoing lawsuits.
Part III analyzes the proposal to nationalize the patent for insulin and Colorado’s
legislation addressing the inaccessibility of insulin due to its high costs for
patients. Part IV suggests that while state legislation capping insulin copays can
benefit patients and put pressure on PBMs within the states, federal legislation
will provide more effective price protections for insulin-dependent diabetics.
I. DIABETES AND THE HISTORY OF INSULIN
Over thirty-seven million Americans, or over 11% of the population, have
diabetes.45 Diabetes can be divided into multiple categories, but the two most
common are type 1 and type 2 diabetes. Type 2 diabetes affects over
thirty million people and is commonly classified as insulin resistance.46 While
individuals with this condition continue to produce insulin naturally, their body
does not recognize the total amount of insulin produced by the pancreas.47 In
earlier stages of this condition, many individuals can control their glucose levels
with oral medication, proper diet, and exercise.48 However, if these measures are
no longer sufficient, the individual will require insulin injections to manage the
disease.49
Type 1 diabetes is an autoimmune disease that occurs when the immune
system attacks the cells in the pancreas that create insulin, called beta cells.50
Some individuals have a gene that makes them more prone to type 1 diabetes,

44. Erin M. Barker, When Market Forces Fail: The Case for Federal Regulation of Insulin Prices,
42 CAMPBELL L. REV. 311, 318 (2020); Louis Rosenfeld, Insulin: Discovery and Controversy, 48 CLINICAL
CHEMISTRY 2270, 2270, 2278 (2002).
45. Statistics About Diabetes, AM. DIABETES ASS’N, https://www.diabetes.org/resources/statistics
/statistics-about-diabetes (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
46. The Difference Between Type 1 and Type 2, JOSLIN DIABETES, https://www.joslin.org/patientcare/diabetes-education/diabetes-learning-center/difference-between-type-1-and-type-2 (last visited Dec. 5,
2022).
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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but this is not determinative of whether they will develop the disease.51 Often,
the development of type 1 diabetes can be triggered by environmental factors,
such as a flu, and can manifest within a few weeks or months.52 Individuals
diagnosed with type 1 diabetes require insulin injections right away, because
their bodies are unable to produce any insulin.53 At this time, insulin cannot be
administered in pill form, because stomach acid would break down the
medication before it could be absorbed.54 Roughly 1.6 million individuals live
with this disease in the United States, and about 64,000 people are diagnosed
with type 1 diabetes every year.55 Type 1 diabetes is also known as juvenile
diabetes because it tends to manifest at a young age, although it can develop at
any age.56 At this moment, no preventative measures exist that can reduce the
risk or slow the progression of type 1 diabetes.57
Type 1 diabetics must constantly track their blood sugar to avoid
hyperglycemia and hypoglycemia.58 Hyperglycemia, also known as high blood
glucose, can lead to long-term health complications and may result in
death if untreated.59 Meanwhile, hypoglycemia, or low blood glucose, can cause
tremors, confusion, and even death.60
Providing affordable access to insulin for diabetics can reduce the risk of
complications and will support the goals of the scientists who discovered the
drug. There are multiple medical resources that are available to insulindependent diabetics to control their condition, but affordability remains a barrier
for many.
A. TYPES OF INSULIN AND WAYS TO ADMINISTER THE MEDICATION
There are multiple types of insulin, such as analog insulin—commonly sold
as rapid-acting, long-acting, and intermediate-acting—which is human insulin.61
The most common types of insulin used are rapid-acting, such as Humalog and
NovoLog, and long-acting, such as Lantus and Levemir.62 Rapid-acting insulin
51. What Is Type 1 Diabetes?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov
/diabetes/basics/what-is-type-1-diabetes.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Lutz Heinemann & Yves Jacques, Oral Insulin and Buccal Insulin: A Critical Reappraisal, 3 J.
DIABETES SCI. & TECH. 568, 571 (2009).
55. Mary A.M. Rogers, Catherine Kim, Tanima Banerjee & Joyce M. Lee, Fluctuations in the Incidence
of Type 1 Diabetes in the United States from 2001 to 2015: A Longitudinal Study, 15 BMC MED. 1, 5 (2017);
Type 1 Diabetes Facts, JDRF, https://www.jdrf.org/t1d-resources/about/facts/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
56. What Is Type 1 Diabetes?, supra note 51.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Manage Blood Sugar, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov
/diabetes/managing/manage-blood-sugar.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
60. Low Blood Sugar (Hypoglycemia), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc.gov
/diabetes/basics/low-blood-sugar.html (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
61. Insulin Basics, AM. DIABETES ASS’N, https://diabetes.org/healthy-living/medication-treatments
/insulin-other-injectables/insulin-basics (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
62. Id.
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is typically injected fifteen minutes before diabetics eat or drink anything with
carbohydrates.63 Long-acting insulin is used by type 1 diabetics once or twice a
day, depending on the body’s needs, and usually stays in the body for twentyfour hours.64 The least commonly used insulin is intermediate-acting insulin,
also known as NPH.65 This type of insulin typically costs $25 per vial, but it is
made from human insulin.66 Human insulin takes between one and three hours
to begin working and remains active for ten to sixteen hours, making it difficult
to predict and therefore rarely used.67 Type 1 diabetics who cannot afford their
usual rapid-acting insulin tend to turn to this affordable option, which does not
provide a long-term solution and can result in fatal DKA.68
In addition to the multiple types of insulin, individuals may choose to
purchase vials or insulin pens, depending on their treatment. Individuals who
use insulin pens require both long-acting and rapid-acting insulin and must
attach single-use pen needles to the insulin pen when self-administering the
medication. 69 Individuals who use vials may purchase syringes to inject the
insulin directly, or can administer the medication with an insulin pump.70 By
using an insulin pump, the individual only requires rapid-acting insulin, because
the pump delivers micro doses every few minutes to keep blood sugar at a stable
level without the need for long-acting insulin.71 Although the individual may
save money by eliminating the need for long-acting insulin, the cost of a pump
is around $4500 and requires additional monthly supplies that cost over $1500
per year.72 Only three insulin pump brands are currently available for purchase
in the United States, and each pump limits patients to specific insulin brands,
63. See id.; About Humalog®, ELI LILLY, https://www.humalog.com/fast-acting-mealtime-insulin (last
visited Dec. 5, 2022).
64. Insulin Basics, supra note 61; Diabetes and Insulin, BETTER HEALTH CHANNEL, https://www.better
health.vic.gov.au/health/conditionsandtreatments/diabetes-and-insulin#types-of-insulin (Oct. 17, 2021).
65. Jewels Doskicz & Sophie Vergnaud, The 6 Types of Insulin: A Guide to Regular, Short, and LongActing Insulins, GOODRX HEALTH, https://www.goodrx.com/classes/insulins/insulin-types-how-to-use (Mar.
30, 2022); Mike Watts, Intermediate Acting Insulin, DIABETES.CO.UK (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.diabetes
.co.uk/insulin/intermediate-acting-insulin.html.
66. Watts, supra note 65; see Lee, supra note 12.
67. Basal Insulins (Intermediate and Long-Acting), THE JOHNS HOPKINS PATIENT GUIDE TO DIABETES,
https://hopkinsdiabetesinfo.org/medications-for-diabetes-intermediate-and-long-acting-insulins/ (last visited
Dec. 5, 2022).
68. See Audrey Farley, Drug Prices Are Killing Diabetics. ‘Walmart Insulin’ Isn’t the Solution, WASH.
POST (Feb. 19, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/2019/02/19/drug-prices-are-killing-diabeticswalmart-insulin-isnt-solution/.
69. Insulin Pens, AM. DIABETES ASS’N, https://www.diabetes.org/healthy-living/devices-technology
/insulin-pens (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
70. Insulin & Other Injectibles: Insulin Routines, AM. DIABETES ASS’N, https://diabetes.org/healthyliving/medication-treatments/insulin-other-injectables/insulin-routines (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
71. Insulin Pumps: Relief and Choice, AM. DIABETES ASS’N, https://www.diabetes.org/healthyliving/medication-treatments/insulin-other-injectables/insulin-pumps-relief-and-choice (last visited Dec. 5,
2022).
72. Ronald T. Ackermann, Amisha Wallia, Raymond Kang, Andrew Cooper, Theodore A. Prospect, Lewis
G. Sandy & Deneen Vojta, Comparative Effectiveness and Costs of Insulin Pump Therapy for Diabetes, 23 AM.
J. MANAGED CARE 353, 353–54 (2017).
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further reducing the options. 73 The lack of competition and high prices for
analog insulin requires patients to attempt unviable solutions, which only adds
to their day-to-day stress, making this disease even more difficult to manage.
B. HISTORY OF INSULIN
Insulin was discovered over a century ago, and while the medication has
evolved to become more effective, the price has exponentially increased, making
it difficult to afford and frustrating the mission of its creators. On January 23,
1922, a fourteen-year-old diabetic boy was the first to receive an effective
insulin injection.74 On January 25, 1922, Frederick Banting, Charles Best, and
James Collip, the co-creators of insulin, signed a memorandum agreeing not to
exploit their creation.75 When the scientists decided to create insulin on a larger
scale for further testing and distribution, they ran into complications, forcing
them to accept an offer to collaborate with an American pharmaceutical
company, Eli Lilly.76 In 1923, Banting, Best, and Collip obtained an American
patent for insulin and the University of Toronto’s manufacturing method. 77
Shortly after, they agreed to sell the patent to the Board of Governors at the
University of Toronto for $1.78
That same year, representatives from the University of Copenhagen
received authorization from the University of Toronto to take a bottle of
insulin to reproduce in Europe. 79 The representatives transported the insulin
to a European nonprofit company, Nordisk Insulin Laboratory.80 It was later
renamed Novo Nordisk Foundation and remains a nonprofit organization with
control over the Danish pharmaceutical company Novo Nordisk.81
At first, the price of insulin was not a significant cause for concern for type
1 diabetics in the United States. In 1982, human insulin was introduced and
marketed at $14 per vial.82 Then in 1996, Eli Lilly introduced analog insulin,
which works faster and reduces the risk of allergies in patients.83 Eli Lilly set the
price of analog insulin at $24 per vial.84 By 2005, the price had gone up to $60

73. T:slim X2 Insulin Pump, TANDEM DIABETES CARE, https://www.tandemdiabetes.com/products/t-slimx2-insulin-pump (last visited Dec. 5, 2022) (discussing important safety information cautioning that this product
can only be used with U-100 insulin, such as Novolog and Humalog).
74. Rosenfeld, supra note 44, at 2278.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 2279.
77. Id. at 2280.
78. Id.
79. Celeste C. Quianzon & Issam Cheikh, History of Insulin, 2 J. CMTY. HOSP. INTERNAL MED. PERSPS. 1,
1 (2012).
80. Id.
81. The History of Novo Nordisk Foundation, NOVO NORDISK FOUND., https://novonordiskfonden.dk/en
/about-the-foundation/history/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
82. Irl B. Hirsch, Insulin in America: A Right or a Privilege?, 29 DIABETES SPECTRUM 130, 130 (2016).
83. See id.
84. Id.
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per vial, and in 2012, the price was around $138 per vial.85 Today, the price of
Humalog, produced by Eli Lilly, costs around $333.96 per vial, and Novolog,
produced by Novo Nordisk, is priced around $351.10 per vial.86 Most diabetics
require two to three vials of insulin per month, sometimes even more.87 The
growing price of a medication that was sold to the University of Toronto for a
single dollar creates an unforgivable situation for insulin-dependent diabetics
who cannot afford their lifesaving medication.
II. HIDDEN PRICING SCHEMES THAT
AFFECT INSULIN PRICES
Although the cost to produce insulin in the United States is under $10, the
price of insulin continues to grow as each company incrementally increases its
list price to match the high prices set by competitors.88 The lack of transparency
allows the parties in the insulin supply chain to manipulate the prices for a higher
profit. 89 PBMs are responsible for negotiating the lowest possible price for
pharmacies, health plans, and consumers. However, the price of insulin
continues to grow and costs consumers more without providing a
clear explanation for the increase. 90 PBMs operate in secrecy with insulin
manufacturers, while individuals around the country struggle to afford their
lifesaving medication.91 As the middlemen, PBMs are able to affect the price of
insulin at every step of the chain, which further allows them to manipulate the
market in their favor. 92 This has led to multiple class-action lawsuits, local
government suits, and government investigations into their insulin pricing
schemes.93
A. HOW PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS AND INSULIN MANUFACTURERS
OPERATE
PBMs portray themselves as a crucial component of the drug market by
acting as the middlemen responsible for negotiating discounts for all parties
involved in the transaction.94 PBMs work with drug manufacturers, health plans,
pharmacies, and consumers. Although PBMs do not interact directly with
85. Id.
86. Lee, supra note 12.
87. David M. Tridgell, Insulin Is Too Expensive for Many of My Patients. It Doesn’t Have To Be., WASH.
POST (June 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/outlook/insulin-is-too-expensive-for-many-of-mypatients-it-doesnt-have-to-be/2017/06/22/c5091c42-56cf-11e7-a204-ad706461fa4f_story.html.
88. See Gotham et al., supra note 8, at 2.
89. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 12, at 76.
90. Cefalu et al., supra note 15, at 1301.
91. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 12, at 32–33.
92. Pharmacy Benefit Managers, supra note 20.
93. See Harris Cnty. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. H-19-4994, 2020 WL 5803483, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29,
2020); Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 4, Chaires v. Novo Nordisk Inc., No. 17-cv-00699 (D.N.J. Feb.
2, 2017); Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 12, Boss v. CVS Health Corp., No. 17-cv-01823
(D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2017); see also STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 12, at 27.
94. Pharmacy Benefit Managers, supra note 20.
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consumers, many large PBMs, including Express Scripts, CVS, and OptumRx,
operate mail-order pharmacies that allow them to provide prescription
medications directly to patients.95 PBMs’ interactions with almost all parties in
the insulin supply chain allow them to lead negotiations and provide minimal
disclosures to each party involved.96 This secrecy allows PBMs to manipulate
the insulin market and increase their profits97 while insulin prices substantially
grow, negatively affecting uninsured and underinsured consumers.
The insulin supply chain revolves around PBMs, because they act as
the center point between manufacturers, pharmacies, and insurers.98 PBMs are
responsible for establishing the formulary and determining which brands will be
“preferred” and therefore covered by the individual’s health plan, resulting in a
larger market share for the manufacturer.99 Excluded brands are not covered by
insurance plans and thus require patients to pay the full costs out of their own
pockets, unless the insurer grants an exception.100 It is crucial for a manufacturer
to have its insulin included in the formulary, because it is otherwise unlikely to
be purchased by patients. The use of formularies allows PBMs to exert control
over manufacturers and push patients toward specific medications.101
The structure of the formulary gives manufacturers an incentive to pay
PBMs a larger rebate to ensure their inclusion in the formulary.102 Sanofi’s CEO,
Olivier Brandicourt, discussed the importance of remaining in good relations
with the PBMs after its insulin, Lantus, was excluded from the formulary by
CVS Health.103 In order to avoid incurring losses, manufacturers raise the price
of insulin to then pay a higher rebate to the PBMs.104 In 2019, Sanofi offered
OptumRx a 79.5% rebate for a preferred commercial formulary placement, a
significant increase from its 42% rebate in 2015.105 Congressional investigations
have begun to slowly uncover the exorbitant rebates that PBMs demand from
manufacturers, which directly affect the price that patients have to pay for
insulin.106
The comparison between the rebates from Sanofi to OptumRx in 2015 and
2019 demonstrates the effect of rapidly increasing rebates on insulin prices. In
95. Harris Cnty., 2020 WL 5803483, at *5.
96. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 12, at 33.
97. Id. at 43.
98. Pharmacy Benefit Managers, supra note 20.
99. Samuel F. Ernst, The Pharmaceutical Industry’s Corrupt Price Discrimination System: A Single
Solution?, 51 U. PAC. L. REV. 475, 483 (2020).
100. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 12, at 66.
101. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 5–6, Boss v. CVS Health Corp., No. 17-cv-01823
(D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2017).
102. Id. at 6–7.
103. See Sanofi’s CEO, Olivier Brandicourt, CEO, Sanofi, Remarks at the Bank of America Merrill Lynch
Global Healthcare Conference (Sept. 16, 2016).
104. Id.
105. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 12, at 60.
106. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 9, Boss v. CVS Health Corp., No. 17-cv-01823
(D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2017).
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2015, one vial of Lantus, Sanofi’s insulin, had a list price of $248.50.107 In order
for OptumRx to include Lantus in its formulary, Sanofi paid a rebate of 42%.108
For every vial that Sanofi sold through OptumRx, the PBM took $119.28, and
Sanofi received $129.22. In 2019, Sanofi offered OptumRx a rebate of
79.5% and increased the price of Lantus to $339.92.109 Now, OptumRx receives
$270.24 for each vial, while Sanofi only nets $69.68 of profit. Thus, although
Sanofi increased the price of insulin, its profit did not increase, but rather
decreased under OptumRx’s formulary because of the high rebate.110
Once PBMs negotiate the rebate and formulary placements with insulin
manufacturers, they provide the formulary to health plans for an administrative
fee. 111 The formulary also includes “preferred” pharmacies. 112 This provides
pharmacies with an incentive to pay the PBMs to be included in the health plan.
Additionally, some plans provide a discount for patients who opt to use the
PBMs’ mail-order pharmacies and order a three-month supply rather than visit
their local pharmacy every month.113 PBMs are also responsible for negotiating
the price that the pharmacy will pay the insulin manufacturer or the wholesaler
for the insulin that it then sells to patients.114 The common factor among all of
these interactions is that the PBMs are supposed to divide the rebate that they
receive from the insulin manufacturer and distribute portions to the health plan
and pharmacy.115 However, some health plans are reporting that PBMs are not
properly distributing the rebate.116 Instead, PBMs are billing the health plans a
higher price for medications than what they are actually paying pharmacies for
the drugs, resulting in an even higher profit for PBMs.117 The growing price of
insulin and the secret rebate mechanisms are sparking inquiries by health plans
and government agencies.118

107. OptumRx 2015 MMA Part D Bid Proposal, in Documents Produced by Sanofi, to Sens. Charles
Grassley & Ron Wyden, Senate Comm. on Fin. (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc/Sanofi_Redacted.pdf.
108. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 12, at 60.
109. BU Pricing Review Board Bid Proposal, in Documents Produced by Sanofi, to Sens. Charles Grassley
& Ron Wyden, Senate Comm. on Fin. 4 (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc
/Sanofi_Redacted.pdf.; Lee, supra note 12.
110. BU Pricing Review Board Bid Proposal, supra note 109, at 270.
111. Cefalu et al., supra note 15, at 1303.
112. See Pharmacy Benefits, BLUESHIELD OF CAL., https://myoptions.blueshieldca.com/cseba/cseba/_
/pharmacy_benefits (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
113. PBM Basics, PHARMACISTS SOC’Y OF THE STATE OF N.Y., INC., https://www.pssny.org/page
/PBMBasics (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
114. Cefalu et al., supra note 15, at 1303.
115. See id.
116. See Pharmacy Benefit Managers, supra note 20.
117. Id.
118. See Harris Cnty. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. H-19-4994, 2020 WL 5803483, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29,
2020).
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B. INSULIN PRICING LITIGATION
The secrecy behind the insulin pricing mechanism has resulted in
needlessly high prices and has sparked multiple class-action lawsuits. These
lawsuits highlight the growing concern for insulin prices around the country and
the unaffordability of this lifesaving medication. In 2017, multiple insulindependent diabetics filed class-action lawsuits against the major PBMs and
insulin manufacturers.119 The complaint in Boss v. CVS Health Corp. alleged
that the continuous increase of insulin prices creates an immense financial
benefit to PBMs and manufacturers but puts an unjustified financial
burden on patients.120 The plaintiffs in Chaires v. Novo Nordisk have alleged
that manufacturers violated multiple state consumer protection laws, as well as
the Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO). 121
Chaires is currently pending in New Jersey against three pharmaceutical
companies, Sanofi-Aventis, Novo Nordisk, and Eli Lilly. 122 Additionally, in
2019, Harris County of Texas filed a lawsuit against the three insulin
manufacturers and the three largest PBMs for RICO violations, conspiracy, and
fraud, which was dismissed in 2022.123 The ongoing Chaires case highlights the
issues with the current insulin-pricing system around the country.
1.

Chaires v. Novo Nordisk

The plaintiffs in Chaires v. Novo Nordisk have alleged that insulin
manufacturers are manipulating the price of insulin in violation of RICO and
multiple state consumer fraud statutes.124 The complaint states that the insulin
manufacturers consistently raise the list price of insulin to increase rebates to the
PBMs to ensure their “preferred” status on the formulary, increasing the
manufacturers’ market spread.125 Furthermore, insulin manufacturers allegedly
raise their prices of insulin in response to each other, sometimes within hours.126
Additionally, analog insulin, the most commonly prescribed insulin, has not
substantially changed in the past ten years, yet the price has increased by about
169%.127 In response, the manufacturers argue that they do not increase the price

119. Class Action Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 1, Boss v. CVS Health Corp., No. 17-cv-01823
(D.N.J. Mar. 17, 2017).
120. Id. at 9.
121. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 9, Chaires v. Novo Nordisk Inc., No. 17-cv-00699 (D.N.J.
Feb. 2, 2017).
122. Id. at 54.
123. Harris Cnty., 2020 WL 5803483, at *1; Harris Cnty. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. H-19-4994, 2022 WL
479943, at *1 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2022).
124. See Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 9, Chaires, v. Novo Nordisk Inc., No. 17-cv-00699 (D.N.J.
Feb. 2, 2017).
125. Id. at 76.
126. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., supra note 12, at 4.
127. Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 43, Chaires v. Novo Nordisk Inc., No. 17-cv-00699 (D.N.J.
Feb. 2, 2017).
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for personal gain.128 Eli Lilly stated that the drug makers must increase the list
prices to remain profitable, because “PBMs demand higher rebates in exchange
for including the drug on their preferred-drug lists.”129
The first claim in the Chaires complaint is that the insulin manufacturers
violated RICO; the defendants moved to dismiss. 130 RICO requires that the
plaintiff prove:
(1) the existence of an enterprise affecting interstate commerce; (2) that the
defendant was employed by or associated with the enterprise; (3) that the
defendant participated . . . , either directly or indirectly, in the conduct or the
affairs of the enterprise; and (4) that he or she participated through a pattern
of racketeering.131

The court determined that the plaintiffs had adequately pleaded all of the
above requirements, because, under a competitive market strategy, the prices
would not rise in such a manner.132 Additionally, these increases would not be
possible unless the insulin manufacturers were cooperating with the PBMs and
maintaining the secrecy of the pricing scheme.133 Nevertheless, the court held
that the plaintiffs were barred from pursuing their RICO claim under the
indirect-purchaser rule, because the patients did not purchase insulin directly
from the insulin manufacturers but from pharmacies.134
The plaintiffs filed a third amended class-action complaint arguing that
while they did not directly purchase insulin from the pharmaceutical companies,
they were directly harmed by the fraud and directly relied on the false list
prices.135 The complaint alleges that although patients cannot purchase insulin
directly from the manufacturers, they are the only available defendants.136 On
December 17, 2021, the court granted in part and denied in part the
manufacturers’ partial motion to dismiss.137 The court granted the motion to
dismiss the federal RICO claim and several state racketeering claims, but denied
the motion as to the state civil conspiracy claims.138 The case remains active.139

128. Id.
129. Id. at 43–44.
130. In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 17-cv-00699, 2019 WL 643709, at *5, *7 (D.N.J. Feb. 15, 2019).
131. Id. at *5.
132. Id. at *6–7.
133. Id. at *6.
134. Id. at *13.
135. Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 145, In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 17-cv-00699 (D.N.J.
Apr. 20, 2021).
136. Id. at 147.
137. In re Insulin Pricing Litig., No. 17-cv-00699, 2021 WL 5980629, at *17 (D.N.J. Dec. 17, 2021).
138. Id.
139. Insulin Overpricing, HAGENS BERMAN, https://www.hbsslaw.com/cases/insulin-overpricing (last
visited Dec. 5, 2022).
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Harris County v. Eli Lilly & Co.

Harris County in Texas filed a lawsuit against Eli Lilly, Sanofi-Aventis,
Novo Nordisk, Express Scripts, CVS Health, and OptumRx in 2019, alleging
that the insulin pricing scheme has significantly increased the list price of insulin
in order to offer PBMs larger rebates.140 The County provides health benefits for
about 38,000 individuals, which include subsidizing the cost of insulin.141 The
County alleged that the PBMs violated RICO by (1) misrepresenting the price
that they negotiated with manufacturers, (2) making multiple fraudulent
statements, (3) and sending fraudulent written solicitation materials by mail.142
Furthermore, it argued that while the price has significantly increased over the
past fifteen years, the increase could not be attributed to inflation or other market
forces.143 These price increases significantly affected the County, because from
2013 to 2018, it spent over $27 million on insulin.144
When PBMs receive rebates from insulin manufacturers, it is expected of
them to provide part of the rebate to pharmacies and health plans. Harris County
negotiated contracts with PBMs requiring them to pay the County a portion of
the rebates that they received from the manufacturer.145 However, the County
alleged that the PBMs instead “relabeled the rebates with vague terms like
‘administrative fees, volume discounts, services fees, [and] price of margin
guarantees’ so that they could keep more of the rebate money for themselves.”146
In addition to the RICO violations, the County alleged that the PBMs violated
the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act and conspired to
commit fraud and unjust enrichment.147
The PBMs moved to dismiss all claims.148 Their first argument was that
they were not working with the manufacturers to artificially inflate the prices.149
However, in 2020, the court denied the motion, stating that the County
successfully alleged that insulin prices would not be so high under competition
in a legitimate market.150 The PBMs’ second argument was that—as in previous
lawsuits against PBMs and insulin manufacturers—the County was an indirect
purchaser and was therefore barred from asserting a RICO claim.151 However,
the court noted that the PBMs make money by providing medications to patients
through their mail-order pharmacies.152 The County stated that PBMs charge
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.

Harris Cnty. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. H-19-4994, 2020 WL 5803482, at *2 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 29, 2020).
Id. at *1.
Id. at *5.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *15, *18.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *8–9.
Id. at *9.
Id. at *13.
See id.
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their customers, which include County-operated health plans, higher prices
for drugs, resulting in higher profits for PBM-owned mail-order pharmacies.153
Although the County did not receive the medications directly from the PBMs, it
“pa[id] the PBM Defendants directly for the overcharges of the diabetes
medication at issues in th[e] case”; therefore, the court held that the indirectpurchaser rule did not bar the County from successfully pleading its RICO
claim.154 While the court denied the PBMs’ initial motions to dismiss, in March
2022, the court entered final judgment dismissing the case as to all defendants
with prejudice.155
Despite the fact that Harris County was dismissed, states have initiated new
investigations and lawsuits.156 These lawsuits against insulin manufacturers and
PBMs will be protracted, but they will open further inquiry into the secrecy
behind insulin pricing.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS AND CURRENT LEGISLATION
The issue of high insulin prices has been ongoing for many years. Scholars
have offered multiple proposals,157 and several states have begun to address this
problem with copay caps on insulin for their constituents.158 One solution that
has been offered is to nationalize the patents for insulin production, which would
allow the U.S. government to use or distribute the patented insulin formula.159
Although nationalizing patents for insulin production would require bipartisan
support, there is precedent for such an action in 2001 with ciprofloxacin. 160
Another suggestion is to increase transparency in the pharmaceutical industry.161
This would eliminate PBMs’ ability to hide their profits and continue increasing
the price of insulin without repercussions or explanation. However, increasing

153. Id. at *14.
154. Id.
155. Harris Cnty. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. H-19-4994, 2022 WL 479943, at *14–15 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 16, 2022)
(dismissing all claims as to defendant OptumRx with prejudice); Harris Cnty. v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. H-19-4994,
slip op. at 1 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 16, 2022) (entering final judgment dismissing the case as to all defendants with
prejudice).
156. See generally Mississippi ex rel. Fitch v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 21-cv-00674, 2022 WL 1624780 (S.D.
Miss. Aug. 9, 2022); Press Release, FTC, FTC Launches Inquiry into Prescription Drug Middlemen Industry
(June 7, 2022), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2022/06/ftc-launches-inquiry-prescription
-drug-middlemen-industry; Press Release, Dana Nessel, Att’y Gen., Mich. Dep’t. of Att’y Gen., Let My
Department Investigate Prescription Drug Prices (Feb. 12, 2022), https://www.michigan.gov/ag/news/pressreleases/2022/02/12/ag-nessel-let-my-department-investigate-prescription-drug-prices; Anna Wilde Mathews,
States Probe Business Practices of Pharmacy Benefit Managers, WALL ST. J. (May 11, 2021, 7:00 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/states-probe-business-practices-of-pharmacy-benefit-managers-11620730804.
157. See generally Barker, supra note 44; Ernst, supra note 99; Jessica Zelitt, Pay or Die: Evaluating the
United States Insulin Pricing Crisis and Realistic Solutions To End It, 50 STETSON L. REV. 453, 460 (2021).
158. See COLO. REV. STAT §§ 10-16-151, 12-280-139 (2021); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5212 (2020); 215
ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356z.41 (2021); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-25 (2021); UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-626 (West
2021).
159. Barker, supra note 44, at 332.
160. Id.
161. Ernst, supra note 99, at 486.
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transparency will not necessarily force PBMs and manufacturers to release all
the pertinent information. Furthermore, they may choose to release a
burdensome amount of information that will be cumbersome to investigate.162
There is another solution: states could simply cap insulin prices or copays.
Colorado is the first state to pass legislation to cap the price of insulin for patients
within the state. Following Colorado’s example, several other states have passed
legislation capping the copay for insulin to alleviate some of the financial
hardships that insulin-dependent diabetics must overcome to afford their
lifesaving medication.
A. NATIONALIZE THE PATENT FOR INSULIN TO INCREASE PRODUCTION
Many high-income countries around the world have special government
organizations responsible for negotiating drug prices. If the manufacturer agrees
on a price, the organization recommends its inclusion. However, if no agreement
is reached, the drug is excluded from the market and another brand is offered to
consumers. For example, in the United Kingdom, the National Institute for
Health and Clinical Excellence determines which drugs to include in its National
Health Service coverage. 163 Similarly, Germany established the Institute for
Quality and Efficiency in Healthcare, which affects all insurers in the county
and sets the price for a drug after it has been on the market for one year.164
Meanwhile, the U.S. government does not negotiate prices with pharmaceutical
companies. This financially impacts both patients and the government, because
Health and Human Services (HHS) cannot negotiate for lower prices, forcing
the government and certain Medicare patients to pay the full price for
medication.165
A proposed solution is to nationalize the insulin patents, which would allow
other companies to create insulin with the same effectiveness and provide more
options in the market.166 One scholar who has written on this topic, Erin Barker,
argues that this provision implies the government’s right to use or manufacture
patent-protected items as long as the patent holder receives compensation,
similar to the concept of eminent domain.167 Under this presumption, the patent
holder can demand compensation but cannot prevent the U.S. “government from
producing the medicine or [authorizing other companies] to produce or import

162. Id.
163. Aaron S. Kesselheim, Jerry Avorn & Ameet Sarpatwari, The High Cost of Prescription Drugs in the
United States, 316 JAMA 857, 860 (2016).
164. Id. at 860 tbl.3.
165. Id. at 862. As of August 16, 2022, HHS cannot negotiate for lower prices, but will be able to negotiate
prices for eligible drugs starting in 2026. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, ch. 169, sec. 1194, § 1320f-3, 136
Stat. 1818, 1836–49. Additionally, it is unlikely that HHS will be able to negotiate prices for analog insulin
based on restrictions in the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022. Id. Although the laws governing Medicare are
important to this topic, they are beyond the scope of this Note and will not be further elaborated.
166. Barker, supra note 44, at 331.
167. Id.
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the medicine.” 168 The proposal relies on 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a) to support the
theory that the U.S. government has the right to nationalize the use of patented
items like insulin.169 The federal statute provides damages and compensation for
the patent holder if the invention is used by the government or with the
government’s consent without receiving license from the patent holder.170
This proposal is based on precedent set by the U.S. government in 2001,
when there was a looming threat of anthrax being used as a chemical weapon.171
The government wanted to stock its supply of ciprofloxacin (Cipro), which is
used to treat the effects of anthrax exposure. However, the manufacturer, Bayer,
refused to produce larger quantities of the antibiotic and would not reduce the
price of the medication for the government.172 In response, the U.S. government
threatened to nationalize the patent for Cipro and import generic versions under
§ 1498.173 Although the government did not have to go through with its threat,
the risk of losing its market share forced Bayer to agree to reduce the price and
provide the government with an adequate supply of Cipro.174
The U.S. government may attempt a similar tactic with insulin
manufacturers. If, however, the threats do not achieve effective results, the
government could nationalize the patent and offer it to generic manufacturers.
The FDA classifies insulin as a biologic and requires that the follow-on product
be highly similar and have no “clinically meaningful differences” from the
original drug.175 This makes it difficult for generic manufacturers to enter the
market, because creating a biologic is costly, costing up to as
much as developing a new drug for new companies. 176 Additionally, insulin
manufacturers participate in “patent evergreening” by making incremental
changes to their product to continuously patent it, creating
additional financial barriers for generic manufacturers.177 Only two follow-on
insulins have been released since its reclassification as a biologic—one of
which was created by Eli Lilly—and have yet to influence insulin prices.178 By
nationalizing or threatening to nationalize the patents, there could be wider
opportunities for generic manufacturers to develop biosimilar insulin, or the
threat may force current manufacturers to decrease their prices.179
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1498(a).
171. Barker, supra note 44, at 332.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Ariel Dora Stern, Jacqueline L. Chen, Melissa Ouellet, Mark R. Trusheim, Zeid El-Kilani, Amber
Jessup & Ernst R. Berndt, Biosimilars and Follow-on Products in the United States: Adoption, Prices, and
Users, 40 HEALTH AFFS. 989, 990 (2021).
176. Zelitt, supra note 157, at 460.
177. Id. at 461.
178. See Basaglar, ELI LILLY, https://www.basaglar.com/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2022); see also Semglee,
VIATRIS, https://www.semglee.com/ (last visited Dec. 5, 2022).
179. Barker, supra note 44, at 330–31.
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While this proposal has potential, it does not address PBMs’ influence over
prescription prices. Barker’s proposed solution does not discuss PBMs’
influence over insulin prices.180 Eli Lilly’s Basaglar was released in 2016 as a
“generic” to Sanofi’s Lantus.181 However, insulin is not considered under the
same category as most generic drugs and therefore does not require physicians
and pharmacies to automatically provide patients with the cheaper generic
version of the drug. Additionally, PBMs still have the discretion to decide which
brands will be a part of the formulary. For example, under OptumRx’s
2021 formulary, Lantus, Sanofi’s insulin, is included under the brand-tier.182
Meanwhile, Eli Lilly’s “generic,” Basaglar, is excluded from the formulary.183
Additionally, the newly released Semglee, the first interchangeable biosimilar
insulin—meaning that pharmacies now have the right to substitute it for brand
name insulin—is also excluded under OptumRx’s formulary.184 While adding
more insulin manufacturers to the market may push the main manufacturers to
reduce their prices, the rebate practices can continue to stifle competition
through formulary exclusions.
B. COLORADO’S INSULIN PRICE CAP LEGISLATION
In 2019, Colorado became the first state in the United States to pass
legislation that capped copays for insulin for Colorado residents. The first
version of the statute required health insurance plans to cap the copay for insulin
at $100. 185 Any additional costs for the medication would be paid by the
insurance provider.186 Colorado set the cap at $100 after multiple deliberations
with insurance companies to ensure that monthly premiums would
not be significantly impacted.187 Later that year, when insurers submitted their
proposed monthly rates to the state for approval, they did not mention the insulin
price caps as being a factor in the rates, stating that the caps were “negligible”
and “de minimis,” which shows that capping the price of insulin does not
financially impact the general insured population.188
The 2019 legislation provided the initial step toward curtailing the price of
insulin. However, the statute neglected to address individuals without insurance

180. See id.
181. FDA Approves Basaglar® (Insulin Glargine Injection), a Long-Acting Insulin Treatment, ELI LILLY
(Dec. 16, 2015), https://investor.lilly.com/news-releases/news-release-details/fda-approves-basaglarr-insulinglargine-injection-long-acting.
182. OPTUM RX, YOUR PRESCRIPTION DRUG LIST/FORMULARY 76 (2021), https://www.optumrx.com
/content/dam/openenrollment/pdfs/ers/1.1.2021-Prescription-Drug-List.pdf.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 77.
185. COLO. REV. STAT § 10-16-151(2) (effective from Aug. 2, 2019, to Sept. 7, 2021).
186. Id.
187. John Ingold, Critics Worried Colorado’s New Law Capping Insulin Costs Would Raise Insurance
Rates. It Hasn’t., THE COLO. SUN (Sept. 11, 2019, 5:00 AM), https://coloradosun.com/2019/09/11/coloradoinsulin-price-insurance/.
188. Id.
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coverage or those with high deductible plans. Additionally, the state law could
not impact Medicare and self-funded health plans, which fall under the Federal
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). These individuals
continue to bear the burden of high insulin costs. Furthermore, the statute capped
the copays for insulin per prescription.189 If an individual required multiple types
of insulin per month, they would be able to take advantage of the cap for each
prescription separately. Therefore, if an individual required both rapid-acting
and long-acting insulins, their copay would be capped at $200 instead of $100,
while the health plan would be responsible for the remaining amount.
In 2021, Colorado passed a new bill amending the existing insulin price
cap to add new protections for uninsured individuals and those with high
deductibles.190 The first change capped the price of insulin at $100 “regardless
of the amount or type of insulin needed to fill the covered person’s prescription
or the number of prescriptions.” 191 Now, individuals with prescriptions for
multiple types of insulin will not be required to pay more than $100 per month.
Additionally, the new bill established a price cap on insulin for those without
insurance.192 Effective January 2022, a program must be established to allow
enrolled individuals to purchase their insulin supply for no more than $50 per
month.193 Although individuals with health plans governed under ERISA are not
explicitly mentioned in the statute, they may also be eligible for the price cap
under this statute if they choose to purchase insulin without using their health
plan.194 This program allows pharmacies to submit an electronic claim to insulin
manufacturers for reimbursement, which is calculated by taking the difference
between the list price and the cost that the patient pays.195 Any amount that
remains after the patient pays their capped copay will be paid by
the manufacturer.196 This new program may potentially limit PBMs’ effect on
insulin prices, because the uninsured do not rely on formularies. Therefore,
manufacturers do not need to pay rebates to reach these patients.
Colorado’s legislation provided a push for other states to pass similar bills
to limit the cost of insulin for their constituents. However, Colorado’s price cap
remains expensive for many consumers and has not explicitly addressed plans
that fall under ERISA. These plans are governed by federal law, and state law
capping insulin prices does not apply. Additionally, these price limits only apply
to Colorado’s constituents; those who live in other states cannot take advantage
of the lower prices. While Colorado provided financial relief for many

189. Id.
190. H.R. 21-1307, 73rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021).
191. COLO. REV. STAT § 10-16-151(2) (effective Sept. 7, 2021).
192. Id. § 12-280-139(7).
193. Id.
194. The language in section 12-280-139(7) does not explicitly include or disqualify individuals with health
plans governed by ERISA, nor does it mention ERISA plans. See id.
195. Id. § 12-280-139(8)(a).
196. Id. § 12-280-139(8)(c)(I).
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individuals within the state, much more must be done to relieve the financial
burden of insulin costs.
IV. ADDITIONAL STATE ACTION AND
FEDERAL LEGISLATION FOR AN EFFICIENT SOLUTION
Insulin prices have impacted individuals for years, and while multiple
solutions have been proposed, none have offered permanent relief. Colorado’s
example provides a framework empowering a state to provide financial
assistance to insulin-dependent diabetics without affecting insurance premiums
for the state’s general population. Colorado’s legislation can be used as a model
in other states to provide their constituents with similar relief as a statewide
solution. However, to comprehensively address the issue and permanently
reduce the price of insulin, the federal government must get involved. Many
legal roadblocks limit a state’s ability to fully cap the cost of insulin, such as
patent protections, federally regulated health plans, and state borders. By
enacting legislation similar to the Insulin Price Reduction Act, which was
introduced in the Senate in 2019, 197 the federal government will be able to
effectively regulate insulin prices and demand disclosure from insulin
manufacturers and PBMs.
A. COLORADO’S INSULIN CAP LEGISLATION AS A MODEL FOR OTHER
STATES
Colorado’s House Bill 21-1307 closed many loopholes that were exploited
by insurers, pharmacies, and insulin manufacturers under House Bill 19-1216.198
Following Colorado, fourteen other states and the District of Columbia have
passed legislation capping the price of insulin. Some states have drafted
legislation similar to Colorado’s original price cap bill, capping the copay at
$100 for individuals with commercial insurance. 199 New Mexico, Utah, and
Texas opted to limit the copay further. New Mexico capped the copay for insulin
at $25 for individuals with commercial insurance.200 Utah capped the price of
insulin at $30 for individuals with commercial insurance and the uninsured.201
Additionally, the $30 per month will be applied regardless of whether the
individual has met their deductible. 202 Texas passed legislation capping the
copay for each insulin prescription at $25 per month for individuals with
commercial insurance.203 Therefore, in Texas, individuals with multiple types of
insulins will end up paying more than $25 per month.
197. S. 2199, 116th Cong. (2019).
198. See H.R. 21-1307, 73rd Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2021); H.R. 19-1216, 71st Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019).
199. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5212(b)(1) (2020); 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/356z.41(c) (West 2021).
200. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-7-25 (West 2021).
201. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-626(4)(a) (West 2021).
202. Id. § 31A-22-626(4)(b).
203. TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1358.103(b) (West 2021).
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Colorado’s legislation not only caps the price of insulin, but also allows the
Attorney General to investigate the insulin pricing scheme. 204 In 2020, the
investigation resulted in a report recommending legislation to address drug price
transparency and require compliance from all actors in the supply chain, such as
PBMs, manufacturers, insurance carriers, and distributors. 205 The report also
recommends joining a “bulk purchasing plan” to increase the state’s purchasing
power and reduce the role of the PBM.206 Colorado could choose to create its
own bulk purchasing plan within the state, or it could join one of five existing
multi-state bulk-buying organizations. 207 By reducing the role of the PBM,
manufacturers would lose the incentive to provide PBMs with such high rebates
for a “preferred” formulary status.
Many health insurance plans already provide some copay limit for certain
insulin brands commonly placed into the brand or second-tier formulary. The
uninsured or individuals with high-deductible plans are the most affected,
because they have to pay the full list price for insulin, which continues to
increase due to the higher rebates demanded by PBMs. Colorado’s and Utah’s
laws, which cap the copay for the uninsured and individuals with high
deductibles, can also reduce PBMs’ dominance over formularies. Uninsured
patients do not rely on formularies, because they are not included in a health
plan and therefore can purchase any insulin. This will provide manufacturers an
incentive to appeal to consumers directly to increase their market share and will
potentially decrease their interest in paying PBMs a higher rebate. Furthermore,
by minimizing PBMs’ control through bulk-purchasing plans, states can reduce
the costs of state-sponsored health plans and provide affordable medication for
insulin-dependent diabetics.
There have been concerns that capping the price of insulin may increase
insurance premiums for everyone. However, a study by Milliman has shown that
a “zero-dollar insulin co-pay cap would only raise insurance premiums by
an average of $5.12 per year.” 208 Most states that have passed insulin price
legislation have a copay cap between $25 and $100. In 2020, health plans in
Colorado submitted their materials to justify their proposed monthly rates to the
Colorado Division of Insurance. The health plans either did not mention the
insulin price caps or stated that the caps were “negligible” and “de minimis” and
did not affect the cost of premiums.209 Health plans tend to negotiate the price
that they pay for insulin, and it seems that the copay caps have not affected the
cost for plans, showing that price limits on insulin can be beneficial to diabetes
patients without causing additional financial expenditures for others.
204. H.R. 19-1216, 71st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019).
205. COLO. DEPT. OF L., PRESCRIPTION INSULIN DRUG PRICING REPORT 58 (2020), https://coag.gov/app
/uploads/2020/11/Insulin-Report-102020.pdf.
206. Id. at 59.
207. Id.
208. Zelitt, supra note 157, at 472.
209. Ingold, supra note 187.
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Although some states and the District of Columbia have started to follow
Colorado’s example and even to offer lower copay limits for their constituents,
the price cap, individuals affected, and requirements vary among the states. For
example, Utah’s legislation applies the price cap to commercially insured and
uninsured individuals, and limits the price at $30 per month for the entire
monthly supply.210 However, Texas’s law does not mention deductibles and is
applied per prescription, which means that an individual who uses two types of
insulin each month will pay $50 instead of $25 for their monthly supply. 211
While these price limits provide some financial relief to insulin-dependent
diabetics, the variation creates confusion. Additionally, the majority of states
have yet to pass legislation addressing the price of insulin. Therefore, a national
solution is necessary to efficiently address insulin prices across the country.
B. FEDERAL INSULIN PRICE CAP
State legislation affecting the price of insulin only impacts the residents of
that state and does not provide much support for individuals with ERISA or
Medicare plans. There are few states with insulin price caps, and with fifty states,
it can take a long time for the entire country to pass similar legislation. By
enacting federal legislation that caps the price of insulin, the U.S. government
would be able to address many of the loopholes that states and the District of
Columbia have struggled to overcome. Although a federal insulin price cap bill
will not resolve the underlying problems with pharmaceutical pricing, it is a
politically viable solution, and health plans have shown their willingness to
cooperate with price caps on insulin.
Federal legislation can provide a stronger foundation for price caps because
federal laws preempt state laws, which can affect the state’s ability to regulate
pharmaceutical prices. In 2005, the District of Columbia passed the Prescription
Drug Excessive Pricing Act, which prohibited the sale of any
patented drug for an excessive price within that jurisdiction.212 The Act defined
an “excessive” price as being over 30% higher than the “comparable price in any
high-income country in which the product is protected by patents.”213 The highincome countries used for comparison were the United Kingdom,
Germany, Canada, and Australia.214 In response, Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America filed a suit against the District, alleging that the Act
was preempted by federal patent laws. 215 Although federal patent laws do
not prohibit a state from regulating the price of patented items, 216 the court
210. UTAH CODE ANN. § 31A-22-626(4) (West 2021).
211. See TEX. INS. CODE ANN. art. 1358.103(b) (West 2021).
212. D.C. CODE ANN. § 28-4553 (West 2007) (preempted by Biotech. Indus. Org. v. District of Columbia,
496 F.3d 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
213. Id. § 28-4554(a).
214. Id. § 28-4552(2).
215. Biotech. Indus. Org., 496 F.3d at 1366.
216. Id. at 1372.
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concluded that assigning penalties for high prices limits the “full exercise of the
exclusionary power that is derived from the patent” and creates an obstacle to
the objectives of patent laws.217
Insulin remains a patented biologic, which can potentially cause issues for
states that aim to regulate its price. Sanofi’s main patent for Lantus expired in
2015; however, the company has filed around seventy additional patents since
2000 and thus will receive patent protection for Lantus until at least 2028.218
While manufacturers continue to extend their patent protection, the possibility
of increased competition remains slim and requires federal interference. Insulin
has been around for almost a hundred years, and the estimated cost of production
of certain types is between $2.32 and $3.76, yet companies are able to increase
the price of insulin every year.219
Furthermore, states cannot affect Medicare plans, and state copay caps
cannot reduce the government’s spending on Medicare prescription drugs. Total
Medicare Part D spending on insulin was $1.4 billion in 2007 and increased to
$13.3 billion in 2017.220 The cost per prescription increased from $96 in 2007 to
$363 in 2017.221 Currently, the federal government does not allow Medicare to
negotiate insulin prices, and therefore insulin’s costs are continuously
increasing as manufacturers increase the list price to appease PBMs.222 Only
federal legislation can cap insulin copays for Medicare or ERISA plans and
reduce the government’s high spending on a medication that has remained
unchanged for over a decade.
Federal legislation is a long-term goal and solution, because it may take
time for Congress to reach a bipartisan agreement that will cap the cost of insulin
for all diabetics. However, the government is moving in a direction that may cap
insulin prices for many insulin-dependent diabetics. In August 2022, the
President signed into law the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, which caps the
price of insulin at $35 per month or 25% of a plan’s negotiated price, whichever
is lower for Medicare Parts B and D, starting in 2023.223 This Act limits the
insulin copay price for Medicare patients, but does not address insulin copays
for private insurance, ERISA plans, or for uninsured individuals.
217. Id. at 1374.
218. Barker, supra note 44, at 318. The topics of biologics and patent “evergreening” are beyond the scope
of this Note. See generally Adam P. Hustad, Competing with Patent Thickets: Antitrust Law’s Role in Promoting
Biosimilars, 102 B.U. L. REV. 675 (2022); Reed F. Beall, Jason W. Nickerson, Warren A. Kaplan & Amir
Attaran, Is Patent “Evergreening” Restricting Access to Medicine/Device Combination Products?, PLOS ONE,
Feb. 24, 2016; Susan Mayor, Insulin Has Never Become a Cheap Generic Drug in the US Because of Companies’
Small Changes to “Evergreen” the Patent, 350 BMJ, Mar. 20, 2015.
219. See Gotham et al., supra note 8, at 2.
220. Juliette Cubanski, Tricia Neuman, Sarah True & Anthony Damico, How Much Does Medicare Spend
on Insulin?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Apr. 1, 2019), https://www.kff.org/medicare/issue-brief/how-much-doesmedicare-spend-on-insulin/.
221. Id.
222. Emily Hanson, The Economic Burdens of Life: Trade Secrecy and the Insulin Pricing Crisis in the
United States, 27 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 251, 264–65 (2020).
223. Inflation Reduction Act of 2022, ch. 169, sec. 1194, § 1320f-3, 136 Stat. 1818, 1902–03.
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By enacting federal legislation that caps the price of insulin for all
diabetics, individuals in states without price caps and those with insurance plans
under ERISA will be able to save money on their lifesaving medication.
However, the Act does not mention any price protections for the uninsured.224
The Act will not resolve the underlying issue of price manipulation in the
pharmaceutical industry by PBMs, but it may provide assistance for some, until
a more comprehensive strategy to tackle PBM influence can be established.
Until federal legislation is passed to cap the cost of insulin for all insulindependent diabetics, nonprofit diabetic groups will continue to call on the federal
government to act to eliminate the financial burden caused by the rising costs of
a lifesaving drug that has been available for decades.
CONCLUSION
The price of insulin has consistently increased over the past several years,
resulting in unnecessary death and medical complications for insulin-dependent
diabetics around the United States. The list price that patients pay at pharmacies
is significantly affected by rebate negotiations between insulin manufacturers
and PBMs. To achieve a preferred placement on a health plan’s formulary,
insulin manufacturers pay PBMs ever-increasing rebates to ensure their
inclusion. Although investigations and reports have revealed parts of these
pricing schemes, not much has been done to curb insulin prices. States like
Colorado and Utah have passed insulin price cap legislation; however, these
limits only affect individuals in states with insulin copay caps and are
inapplicable to federally regulated health plans. While insulin price caps at the
state level are a possible and beneficial short-term solution, the better solution is
to enact federal legislation that will apply to all individuals, regardless of the
type of health plan. Expanding the insulin price cap in the Inflation Reduction
Act of 2022 to all insulin-dependent diabetics may provide the necessary
financial relief to many around the country to prevent the tragic outcomes of
Alec and Meaghan that continue to devastate families throughout the United
States.
Insulin prices are affected by manufacturers, PBMs, distribution chains,
and the lack of competition due to the strictness of the FDA’s biologic
requirements. Therefore, state and federal legislation is vital to protecting
insulin-dependent diabetics from the effects of PBMs’ and manufacturers’ price
manipulation. Redesigning the entire pharmaceutical industry in the United
States will take not years, but decades. Alec and Meaghan are only two examples
of the hundreds of type 1 diabetics who have died in this country because they
could not afford their lifesaving medication. It is too late for them, but it is not
too late to help others like them now.

224. See generally id.

